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THE 2011 BERNSTEIN LECTURE AT  
ST. JOHN’S UNIVERSITY  
SCHOOL OF LAW 
HON. PAUL A. CROTTY† 
Good afternoon.  I am glad to be here at St. John’s.  I want to 
thank Professor Cavanagh for the invitation and for helping me 
prepare.  As always, his comments were insightful and helpful. 
Lewis Bernstein served his country in war and in peace.  For 
thirty years, he headed the Special Litigation Unit at the 
Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division.  Chief among his 
cases were the IBM case and the broad spectrum antibiotic drug 
cases.  The tenor of his work is celebrated by his co-workers and 
acolytes who learned from the master.  He is the embodiment of 
the wisdom that public service, when done well and honestly, is 
the noblest of all professions. 
I am honored to receive this award and humbled by it.  Yet, I 
am bold enough to try to add my thoughts to the Bernstein 
Lectures, which have shed so much illumination on the 
intricacies of our antitrust laws. 
I do not want to slight any of the distinguished graduates of 
St. John’s by not mentioning them, but I would be remiss if I did 
not mention Hugh Leo Carey, who graduated from St. John’s 
Law School, and became the man who saved New York.  He was 
succeeded in the Governor’s seat by another great man, Mario M. 
Cuomo.  For two decades, from 1974 to 1994, our state was 
blessed with leaders who recognized the common good and were 
dedicated to achieving it.  They were inspired leaders, and St. 
John’s Law School proudly claims them as its graduates. 
 
† Paul A. Crotty has served as a United States District Judge for the Southern 
District of New York since August 1, 2005. He served as Corporation Counsel for 
Mayor Giuliani (1994–1997) and previously served as Commissioner of the Office of 
Financial Services; Commissioner of Finance; and Commissioner of Housing, 
Preservation and Development (1984–1988) for Mayor Koch. He practiced law with 
Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine (1969–1984; 1988–1993); and was also Group 
President for New York and Connecticut at Verizon, Inc. (1997–2005). 
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My mentor when I first started to practice, and continuing 
until he passed away in 1998, was Owen McGivern.  He was a 
member of the State Assembly; a Naval Officer, who fought with 
the O.S.S. during World War II; a Judge on the Court of General 
Sessions and Supreme Court; and, eventually, Presiding Justice 
of the First Department of the Appellate Division.  Judge 
McGivern was not the only great judge St. John’s Law School can 
be proud of: Judge on the New York Court of Appeals and Dean 
Emeritus of the Law School, Joseph Bellacosa; Judge Carmen 
Ciparick on the New York Court of Appeals; Ray Dearie, who just 
stepped down as Chief Judge in the Eastern District of New 
York; and, in the Southern District, the late John Sprizzo, and P. 
Kevin Castel, who presides with great intelligence and a firm 
grasp on reality.  It is an honor to serve with Judge Castel.  
Other alumni include, Bob McGuire, our former Police 
Commissioner; Charles “Joe” Hynes, the Brooklyn District 
Attorney; and Congressman Charles Rangel.  They embody the 
very best in public service. 
I want to talk about antitrust law and motions for summary 
judgment, but it will be helpful to put these two matters in 
context with what we do in federal courts throughout the United 
States. 
The United States Courts are established by Article III of the 
Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789.1  We play an 
important role in American society, but to be fair, most citizens 
do not have a firm grip on what we do.  Too often, the response to 
a court decision is “well, who gave him or her that power?” or 
“who is she or he to do something like that?”  As a matter of fact, 
Mr. Justice Breyer’s recent book, Making Our Democracy Work,2 
tries to explain how and why the public accepts a judicial 
pronouncement as legitimate, or rejects it as illegitimate. 
It is important for the bar, and for judges, to maintain the 
public’s confidence in how the courts work in interpreting the 
Constitution, applying statutory law, and deciding cases—civil 
and criminal—that come before us.  How do we do that?  We 
must retain our independence, and there must be transparency 
to the working of the courts, fairness in the process, and justice 
in the result. 
 
1 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. 
2 See generally STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S 
VIEW (2010). 
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Much of our work involves issues of constitutional 
dimensions.  The issues arise everyday, mostly in criminal law:  
Was a search unreasonable; was a confession truly voluntary; did 
the defendant have effective assistance of counsel? 
How do you balance the right to assemble with the need for 
public order and safety?  Much more of our work requires 
statutory analysis and statutory application in patents, 
trademarks, copyrights, and securities law cases. 
Of course, litigants and the courts have a need for speed, for 
efficiency, and for a just result, with the lowest transaction costs.  
We must be conscious of the world in which we live.  The world is 
shrinking; we are now a global economy.  While you will find 
English to be the primary language of the global economy, not 
everyone believes that the Anglo-American method of disposing 
of civil disputes is their cup of tea.  It is expensive, takes too long, 
and is unpredictable. 
A businessman in Japan, or in China, or even in 
Kazakhstan, could ask:  Why do you take twelve people, who 
know nothing of the dispute, and probably nothing about 
business, and then entrust them with a decision that determines 
questions involving millions of dollars? 
The American answer is that jury trials are the critical 
ingredient in disposing of the business that comes before us.  
When you read the Declaration of Independence, you will note 
that the far greater portion of the document deals with a listing 
of grievances, which Jefferson said, had to be “submitted to a 
candid world,”3 as the justification for separation and 
independence.  Many of the grievances dealt with how judges 
were selected and how colonial juries were avoided.  The colonists 
wanted to participate in the governance of their communities, 
and juries were a vital part of that participation.  When “We the 
People” adopted the Constitution a decade later, the right to a 
jury trial was embedded in Article III.  But that was deemed 
insufficient.  The state ratification conventions demonstrated a 
continuing concern that juries always be available to resolve 
disputes.  Juries are featured in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth 
Amendments, and, especially, the Seventh Amendment of the 
Bill of Rights. 
 
3 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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Juries are not going away; the plain fact is that the 
overwhelming majority of cases are not disposed of by juries, but 
by settlement or disposition by way of judicial order.  Indeed, 
very few civil cases, less than two percent, go to trial.  Today, I 
want to discuss antitrust law and the granting of summary 
judgment. 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern all court actions 
in United States District Courts.  The goal of the rules is “to 
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action and proceeding.”4  The rules follow the order of litigation 
and begin with how to commence an action, serve papers, move 
to dismiss, engage in discovery, proceed with trial, and end with 
judgments. 
We are going to focus on Rule 56 dealing with summary 
judgment. 
Summary judgment is applicable to claims made by plaintiff 
and defenses raised by defendant.  The movant is required to 
show “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact 
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”5  
Rule 56 requires the court to “state on the record the reasons for 
granting or denying the motion.”6 
As you will see, this requirement is important to a judge.  He 
or she can easily state that the motion is denied; there is a 
genuine dispute as to material facts. 
The material facts in dispute do not have to be specified.  A 
decision like this is virtually bullet proof; it is not final, and 
hence, not reviewable.  On the other hand, higher courts 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment would not accept an 
order which states in words or substance:  “The Court has 
reviewed the parties’ submissions and after due consideration it 
has determined there are no genuine disputes as to any material 
facts.  Accordingly, judgment will be entered for plaintiff.”  That 
clearly does not fly. 
From a judicial viewpoint, granting a motion for summary 
judgment requires a careful review of the facts, as well as a 
careful consideration of the law.  It may take the judge days 
indeed weeks to carefully review an extensive record to resolve  
 
 
4 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
5 Id. at 56(a). 
6 Id. 
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the issues.  The question arises:  Is it worth the time to go 
through the exercise, or is it simpler for the judge to set the 
matter down for trial? 
As you can tell from my short précis of the rules, a plaintiff 
does not file a complaint and immediately report to the 
defendant’s cashier’s window.  The pleadings can be tested by 
motions addressed to their sufficiency and adequacy. 
In days of yore, motions to dismiss were not granted, except 
in rare cases.  This was due to the standard for assessing the 
adequacy of the pleadings.  Rule 8 required three things: (1) a 
statement of the basis for jurisdiction; (2) “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief”; and (3) a demand for relief.7  Conley v. Gibson,8 decided in 
1957, set forth the pleading standard for the next fifty years.  
Plaintiff must give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is 
and the grounds upon which it rests.  If you wish to get an idea of 
how things used to be, and still are for some types of claims, read 
the forms which, incidentally, have not changed. 
The following is all you have to allege on a complaint form: 
(1) (Statement of jurisdiction); (2) On (Date) at (Place), defendant 
negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff; (3) As a 
result, promptly was physically injured, lost wages or income, 
suffered physical and mental pain, and incurred medical 
expenses of $__________.9 
In a commercial loan transaction, the requirements are just 
as brief in Form 10: (1) Jurisdiction; (2) On (Date), the defendant 
executed and delivered a note promising to pay the plaintiff on 
(Date) the sum of $__________ with interest at the rate of ____%.  
A copy of the note is attached; (3) Defendant has not paid the 
amount owed.10 
There is an evolving standard in complex cases.  And not to 
disclose too much of my talk too soon; I will tell you that there 
used to be close to a special set of rules for summary judgment in 
antitrust cases.  That is gone now.  Summary judgment is as 
available in antitrust cases as it is in any kind of case.  The net  
 
 
7 Id. at 8(a). 
8 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), overruled in part by Bell Atl. Corp v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
9 FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11. 
10 FED. R. CIV. P. Form 10. 
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effect for antitrust cases is that it is tougher to plead a viable 
antitrust claim and easier to obtain summary judgment on an 
antitrust action. 
Let us spend a moment on the evolution of pleading 
requirements. 
On a motion to dismiss, the facts are assumed to be true and 
all favorable inferences are drawn in favor of the opponent of the 
motion to dismiss.  As I said not too long ago, all the complaint 
had to do was put the defendant on notice and then we were off 
on discovery, perhaps slowed down by an occasional motion for a 
more definite statement. 
Discovery was readily available on most every claim.  Some 
of the claims are absurd on their face.  For example, people 
complaining of receiving negative messages from the CIA on the 
fillings in their molars.  And the worst is, in some of these cases, 
the plaintiff has paid the filing fee.  That means the complaint 
does not have to meet the standards for in forma pauperis 
complaints—frivolous and malicious claims may not be brought 
in forma pauperis.11 
The standard for dismissal at least as set forth in Conley was 
that claims were not to be dismissed “unless it appears beyond 
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his 
claim which would entitle him to relief.”12 
But after fifty years, Conley was interred or at least put into 
intensive care—the Almighty’s departure lounge.  The Supreme 
Court has advised us that Conley is “best forgotten as an 
incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard.”13 
Now, in complex cases, you cannot plead “labels or 
conclusions”; “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 
action will not do.”14  Instead, the factual allegations must be 
sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.  
The complaint must demonstrate that the claim for relief is not 
just possible, but rather, plausible.15 
 
 
11 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2006). 
12 Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46. 
13 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007). 
14 Id. at 555. 
15 Id. 
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Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly dealt with the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996.16  In order to gain access to the 
long distance market, the local telephone monopoly had to open 
up its local market to competition.  Twombly was a phone 
subscriber who claimed to want better service.  He alleged that 
phone companies—also known as the Baby Bells or the 
incumbent local exchange carriers (“ILECs”)—engaged in a 
conspiracy (1) to inhibit the growth of competitive local exchange 
carriers (“CLECs”) and (2) to refrain from competing against one 
another in contiguous markets—one CEO said competing in one 
another’s ILEC territory did not seem right.17 
At the heart of the Twombly complaint is that the Baby Bells 
or the ILECs engaged in parallel conduct, or matching behavior.  
There was no allegation of actual agreement among the Baby 
Bells, although an agreement by inference was asserted. 
The allegation of parallel conduct was not sufficient because 
the parallel conduct, when viewed in light of common economic 
experience, did not amount to an agreement.  Rather than illegal 
conduct based on an agreement by inference, which plaintiffs 
alleged, the natural, unilateral action of each individual company 
was intent on preserving its regional dominance.  As to the 
decision of each ILEC not to enter another ILEC’s territory, 
certainly there was parallel conduct, but not a conspiracy, “if 
history teaches anything.”  The ILECs were born into a world of 
monopoly and were used to sitting tight and expecting their 
monopolist neighbor to do the same.  Remember, in antitrust 
there is no duty to aid competitors, as stated in Verizon 
Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP.18 
The Supreme Court denied it was creating a heightened 
pleading standard of requiring specific facts.  Rather, the Court 
was requiring only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face.  Plausibility had to take on the 
requirements of the antitrust law where parallel conduct is not 
sufficient to demonstrate a conspiracy. 
 
16 Id. at 549. 
17 Id. at 550–51. You should not conclude that CLECs were simply upstarts. The 
largest CLEC was AT&T which was intent on preserving its exclusive position in the 
long distance market. Other CLECs were Time Warner and Cablevision, large 
companies that sought to expand their exclusive franchise in the cable market. 
18 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004). 
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So now, except in run-of-the-mill cases, and certainly in 
antitrust cases and securities cases, you have the requirement to 
allege facts sufficient to show plausibility before you are entitled 
to get discovery on your claim. 
What justified this sea change in pleading for antitrust and 
other complex cases?  The Court offered its own explanation:  
Antitrust discovery can be expensive.  So, it is a cautionary rule:  
Before cost is imposed, let us be sure we have a claim that has a 
plausible chance of prevailing.  The proposed class in Twombly 
had ninety percent of all customers and dealt with an unusual 
variety of antitrust violations which occurred over a seven year 
period.  It would have been a case with high discovery costs. 
The traditional answer that the wheat would be separated 
from the chaff without undue expense and time by a wily judge’s 
following the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for discovery and 
the Manual for Complex Litigation was not a satisfactory 
answer.  Indeed, experience has demonstrated, it is a vain hope. 
So now we know that you have to allege enough facts so that 
a pleading is nudged from the speculative to the plausible.  Does 
that mean the plaintiff can report to the defendant’s cashier’s 
window?  The answer is not quite yet. 
In most cases involving summary judgment, there has been 
discovery where documents have been produced, depositions 
taken, affidavits filed, and issues have been fully explored.  But, 
there is nothing in the rules that restrict a summary judgment 
motion to a post-discovery environment.  It can be brought in 
much sooner, and Rule 12(d) provides a mechanism for 
conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion to a motion for 
summary judgment where “matters outside the pleadings are 
presented to . . . the court.”19 
Summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56, provides for the 
prompt disposition of a case in which there are no genuine issues 
as to any material fact or in which only a question of law is 
involved. 
By addressing assertions of unwarranted claims, or getting 
rid of sham defenses, summary judgment allows the parties to 
get expedited justice and some pressure on court dockets is 
relieved.  Even if only partial summary judgment on a claim or  
 
 
19 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). 
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defense is granted, that may very well save trial time by 
removing a claim or defense.  It may also contribute to the 
settlement of the action. 
Expedition and efficiency are important, but the chief 
requirement is that justice be done.  Nonetheless, if matters can 
be expedited, and unnecessary trials avoided—for example, there 
are no genuine issues of material facts which have been raised—
there is no good reason to deny a motion for summary judgment. 
Now, what is the difference between a Rule 12 and Rule 56 
motion?  It is a subtle distinction which eludes the general 
public, law students, and sometimes professors and their 
students.  Judges have to be included too! 
Rule 12 motions address the sufficiency of the pleadings, not 
whether there is an actual claim that is meritorious.  The 
question is does a claim exist as alleged in the complaint looking 
only at the complaint? 
Summary judgment is usually based on far more than the 
pleadings—affidavits, depositions, and documents—the fruits of 
discovery.  Considering all of them together, the moving party 
argues, that given the state of the record, there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact, and, accordingly, the moving party 
is entitled to judgment on the merits as a matter of law. 
One of the reasons for the lack of clarity in distinguishing 
between Rule 12 and Rule 56 motions is the way in which judges 
handle these motions. 
Remember Rule 1—judges should interpret the rules to 
effect the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination and 
resolution of every action.  If you can get rid of a case or a 
defense, does it make any difference how the motion and route to 
a decision is denominated?  To paraphrase Shakespeare, can’t a 
rose by any other name be just as sweet? 
The following are some distinctions which might be helpful.  
First, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is addressed to the face of the 
complaint.  Second, a Rule 12(c) motion is restricted to the 
contents of the pleadings as supplemented by certain facts 
outside the pleadings.  Third, a Rule 56 motion, testing whether 
any genuine issue of material fact is present for a claim or a 
defense, is based on a fuller record of facts. 
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The timing is another key indicator.  Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(c) 
motions are typically made at the commencement of the 
proceeding.  And Rule 56 motions are normally made post-
discovery. 
Unlike the Criminal Rules which contemplate one “omnibus” 
motion, keep in mind that the Civil Rules allow “seriatim” 
motions.  If you make a Rule 12(b) motion, after discovery you 
can move for summary judgment under Rule 56; and if the initial 
Rule 56 motion is denied because there is an issue, for example, 
of credibility, a party can still move under Rule 50 for a directed 
verdict on the same issue on which summary judgment was 
denied. 
Remember that partial summary judgment and denials of 
summary judgment are not final orders and may not be appealed. 
I want to say a word here about the right to a jury trial.  
Notwithstanding that fewer and fewer cases go to trial, much of 
the literature and scholarship on Rule 12 and Rule 56 must be 
analyzed from the perspective of the constitutional preference for 
jury trials. 
In a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the facts as alleged are 
presumed to be true, and all inferences favorable to the pleadings 
must be drawn.  On that basis, we test the legal sufficiency of the 
complaint.  The bias is towards preserving the claim so that it 
may be adjudicated at trial. 
Similarly, when considering an issue on summary judgment, 
the district court must read the record in the light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion.  The opposing party gets the 
benefit of the doubt. 
This thumb on the scales of justice can be understood only in 
light of our respect for the right to a jury trial.  That right cannot 
be denied, unless the court is satisfied that there is no cognizable 
claim.  There is no genuine issue of material fact. 
Let’s continue our discussion of the requirements of a good 
motion for summary judgment. 
The movant is entitled to file affidavits in support of the 
motion.  The movant wants to demonstrate that upon due 
consideration of the merits of the dispute, the moving party is 
entitled to judgment.  While the rules do not require that 
affidavits be submitted in response, the plain fact is that the non-
moving party must file papers in response.  While the rules 
specify the times for making the required responses, many judges 
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allow the parties to set their own schedule.  I know that I do as a 
matter both of courtesy and practicality.  The slightly longer 
periods I allow produce hopefully better, more succinct, concise, 
and focused papers. 
A motion for summary judgment is perhaps more urgent 
than a motion to dismiss, although I do not mean to suggest that 
a motion to dismiss should be taken lightly.  Motions to dismiss, 
however, are frequently accompanied by leave to replead.  Circuit 
courts look on this form of relief as appropriate.  While the 
pleading cycle cannot be endless, motions denying leave to 
replead are closely scrutinized on appeal.  A district court judge 
had better have a good reason for denying leave to replead. 
With summary judgment, there is no second chance.  The 
pleadings state a claim; but now the facts are in if there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the claim or defense cannot be 
established, then judgment is entered and the case is ended.  
There is no leave to replead. 
Local Rule 56.120 here in the Southern and Eastern Districts 
of New York elaborates on Rule 56’s procedural requirements 
and aims to highlight the material facts as to which there are no 
genuine issues.  The paragraphs have to be supported by 
citations to specific evidence—for example, depositions, 
documents, affidavits. 
But the practice with regard to Rule 56 has not been helpful.  
The Southern District of New York has recently adopted pilot 
rules for case management techniques for complex civil cases.21  
Antitrust cases are defined as complex, and so are subject to 
these new pilot rules. 
You will be interested to learn that in the Southern District 
of New York, the busiest and most active court in the federal 
system, is not exactly overwhelmed by antitrust cases.  In 2009, 
forty-nine antitrust cases were filed, in 2010, fify-two, and this 
year through the end of August, forty-one. 
 
20 E.D.N.Y. R. 56.1; S.D.N.Y. R. 56.1. 
21 See generally Project Pilot Hopes To Tame Complex Civil Cases, THE THIRD 
BRANCH (Dec. 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/11-12-01/Pilot_ 
Project_Hopes_to_Tame_Complex_Civil_Cases.aspx; see REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL 
IMPROVEMENTS COMMITTEE: PILOT PROJECT REGARDING CASE MANAGEMENT 
TECHNIQUES FOR COMPLEX CIVIL CASES 1–14 (Oct. 2011), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/Ta
b%20VI%20Appendix%20F%20SDNY%20Pilot%20Project%20for%20Complex%20Li
tigation.pdf. 
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In contrast, intellectual property cases—patent and 
trademark cases—are far higher by a multiple of eight—more 
than 400.  Securities and commodities cases are four to five times 
higher—200 to 250. 
In any event, for these complex cases, 56.1 statements are no 
longer mandatory and do not need to be filed if the parties so 
request and the court approves.  But if the court requires 56.1 
statements, they may not exceed twenty pages per party. 
Let me interpret this for you.  Local Rule 56.1 statements 
can be useful, if they are short and concise.  Their utility to the 
court diminishes with volume.  It is not a case of the more the 
merrier, it is the opposite:  The more there is, the less help.  
Concision counts and it is the most effective way to prevail. 
Lawyers generally have to restrain their habit of trying to 
trace every legal principle back to the invention of money as an 
instrument of trade.  Get to the point. 
From a personal standpoint, I prefer 56.1 statements.  I find 
them very helpful—if done well. 
A good 56.1 statement forces the parties to set forth and 
address material facts about which there is no dispute.  Even if 
there is a dispute, there are probably fewer after a 56.1 exercise 
than before.  So, it is not an idle exercise.  And, even if summary 
judgment is not granted, the fact that some material facts were 
agreed to means that there has been some improvement in 
judicial efficiency and economy. 
But, if the parties do not contain themselves, the utility of 
the 56.1 statement erodes rapidly.  Let me give you an example:  
A separately numbered paragraph asserts a fact, and in support 
of that fact there is a reference to three or four depositions and 
an affidavit, none of which support the separately numbered 
paragraph, but rather, require a reading of all three or four 
depositions, together with the affidavit, and the drawing of an 
inference by the court based on circumstantial evidence.  You can 
imagine what is going to happen here:  The game is not worth the 
candle.  Does the judge really want to become the thirteenth 
juror?  When you take your depositions, you have to be mindful of 
the opportunities for use in a motion for summary judgment or at 
trial. 
You will recall, I talked about the bias embedded in Rule 
12(b) and Rule 56 motions to preserve the right to jury trials.  
How does that work in practice, and how does it work in 
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antitrust cases?  To chart the evolution of this, let us start with 
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,22 decided over fifty 
years ago.  I consider this to be a recent case because it occurred 
within my lifetime, although it was before cable. 
Poller owned a UHF TV Station in Milwaukee.  Columbia 
Broadcasting System (“CBS”) exercised its contract right to 
cancel Poller’s affiliation agreement.  Poller alleged a conspiracy 
to drive UHF stations out of business in favor of VHF which CBS 
utilized.  Pursuant to the conspiracy, CBS acquired another UHF 
competitor, converted it to VHF, and left Poller high and dry.  
Poller went out of business.  Justice Harlan in his dissent—with 
Frankfurter, Whittaker and Stewart—described the case as one 
of those “not unfamiliar in treble-damage litigation, where injury 
resulting from normal business hazards is sought to be made 
redressable by casting the affair in antitrust terms.”23  But the 
majority was not swayed—most particularly because the district 
court had granted CBS’s motion for summary judgment. 
The Supreme Court—Clark, Warren, Douglas, Black, and 
Brennan—held:  
We look at the record on summary judgment in the light most 
favorable to Poller, the party opposing the motion, and conclude 
here that [summary judgment] should not have been granted.  
We believe that summary procedures should be used sparingly 
in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play 
leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged 
conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot.  It is only 
when the witnesses are present and subject to cross-
examination that their credibility and the weight to be given 
their testimony can be appraised.  Trial by affidavit is no 
substitute for trial by jury which so long has been the hallmark 
of “even handed justice.”24 
You will note the bias in favor of jury trials and the wonders of 
cross examination. 
A quarter century later, in Matsushita Electric Industrial 
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,25another five to four  decision, the 
Court charted a course 180 degrees from the Poller holding.  
Justice Powell, who wrote the majority opinion, was joined by 
 
22 368 U.S. 464 (1962). 
23 Id. at 474 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
24 Id. at 473 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
25 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
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Burger, Rehnquist, Marshall, and O’Connor.  Justice Powell was 
appointed by Richard Nixon, after a distinguished career 
representing major corporate interests.  He was open to antitrust 
doctrine which promoted efficiency.  Mr. Justice White dissented, 
joined by Blackmon, Brennan, and Stevens.  Justice Brennan 
was in the majority in Poller; he was consistent, and so he ended 
up with the dissenters in Matsushita. 
Plaintiffs in Matsushita alleged that the Japanese electronic 
products manufacturers—mostly TV sets—maintained and fixed 
continually high prices in Japan, and at the same time fixed and 
maintained low prices here in the United States.  The Japanese 
manufacturers conspired in this way in order to drive American 
manufacturers out of business. 
At the end of a prolonged period of discovery in which there 
was voluminous document production, the district court ordered 
the parties to file statements listing all the documents that would 
be offered at trial.  The judge then found most of the materials 
offered by the American manufacturers—the plaintiffs—were 
inadmissible.  Further, he found, based on the admissible 
evidence, that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to 
the existence of a conspiracy, and that any inference of a 
conspiracy was unreasonable.  Accordingly, the district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the Japanese defendants. 
The Third Circuit reversed, finding there was evidence of a 
conspiracy.  The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings.  On remand, the Third Circuit entered an 
order dismissing the complaint of the American manufacturers. 
What happened in the intervening twenty-five years after 
Poller?  Well, one thing is obvious.  With the exception of Mr. 
Justice Brennan, it was a new court.  And while it was a five to 
four decision, you cannot say it was a liberal or conservative 
split.  In Matsushita, Justice Marshall was in the majority; 
Justice Brennan, in the minority.  Justice Powell was in the 
majority; Justice White, in the minority. 
The language of Rule 56 had not changed.  It still permitted 
summary judgment where there was no genuine issue of material 
fact.  And, if there were genuine issues, there had to be a trial.  
The Matsushita majority recognized that summarizing the facts, 
given “this case’s long history” was a “daunting task.”  So, rather 
than engage in that task which they found to be “unnecessary,”  
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the majority analyzed instead the appropriate standard for 
reviewing a voluminous record and decided whether summary 
judgment should be awarded in an antitrust case. 
During the intervening twenty-five years, antitrust law 
continued its development.  The antitrust cases post-World War 
II to the mid-70s were dominated by per se rules.  Allegations of 
price fixing set off fire alarms, per se.  Starting in the mid-70s, 
there was a drawing away from the per se approach, and instead 
the rule of reason became more prevalent.  Courts were called on 
to analyze the economic effects of the conduct being evaluated 
under the antitrust laws.  Courts began to recognize that firms, 
even dominant firms, should have considerable freedom to choose 
product pricing and new product development.  For example, 
Kodak’s right even as a putative monopolist to introduce new and 
different products.26 
And while we are talking about developments on antitrust 
law, let me observe that industrial, manufacturing, and 
technological developments have a great impact on the 
application of antitrust law.  In addition to procedure and the 
substantive law, you must consider what is happening in the 
industry or market you are considering. 
I mentioned Kodak.  Its monopoly dealt with silver halide 
crystals embedded in micro-thin layers of dyes and gelatins 
coated on an acetate base—it is better known as film.  Film has 
been done in by digital photography.  Kodak’s monopoly 
evaporated and today it is discussing the possibility of 
bankruptcy. 
I mentioned Twombly.  The Baby Bells had a monopoly on 
local service because they controlled the last mile of wiring from 
the central office to the customer’s premises.  But the Baby Bells 
wanted to get into the far more lucrative long distance market 
where prices ran up to fifteen cents per minute.  This price was 
the result of regulatory tinkering in which long distance 
subsidized local pricing and business subsidized residential.  By 
the time that Baby Bells demonstrated that the local markets 
were open to competition, the high-priced, long distance market 
had disappeared. 
 
 
26 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 281 (2d Cir. 1979). 
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Cellular technology had developed to the point where it was 
approaching a critical mass; it needed one more boost to the 
traffic on its network.  And here, it was pricing all phone calls the 
same whether it was local or long distance.  Cellular phones 
adopted the bucket of minutes approach; all phone calls—local 
and long distance—were priced the same.  It boosted phone 
traffic so the cellular network was economically viable.  And it 
forced the local phone companies—the Baby Bells—to follow suit.  
The Baby Bells lost out on the long distance market which 
motivated its giving up its “last mile” monopoly. 
Let me examine another industry, the oil and gas industry.  
In the early 80s, the major oil companies went on a binge of 
proposed mergers.  Why?  Well stock prices of oil companies were 
falling so that it was actually cheaper to buy a competitive oil 
company with proven oil reserves, than it was to spend the 
money to find or explore for your own reserves.  In other words, 
finding oil got to be more expensive than the cost of acquiring a 
company in a stock deal.  All of the attempts were enjoined under 
the antitrust laws.  One oil company found its white knight in 
DuPont, another in U.S. Steel.  What happened next? 
Well less than two decades later Exxon and Mobil merged to 
form a corporation of unbelievable size—both traced their 
beginnings to the Standard Oil Company which was broken up in 
1916.  And what did Exxon and Mobil have to do?  They had to 
divest themselves of their retail gas station businesses; that 
divestiture was not the lucrative end of the business.  Both 
companies were glad to be rid of the retail businesses.  Indeed 
getting rid of those gas stations was the antitrust equivalent of 
Brer Rabbit being asked to be thrown into the briar patch. 
Let us return now to Matsushita which looked at both 
antitrust law and the electronics manufacturing industry. 
The majority in Matsushita looked at the American 
manufacturers’ allegations and concluded they did not make 
much sense from a United States antitrust perspective.  First of 
all, the alleged conspiracy to keep prices high in Japan was of no 
concern to the United States.  The United States’ antitrust policy 
protected American interests in the United States.  Our laws do 
not regulate the competitive conditions of other nations’ 
economies. 
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Similarly, a conspiracy to keep prices artificially high would 
violate the antitrust laws, but it would not be a source of injury 
to the plaintiffs.  They would not suffer an antitrust injury.  
Indeed, they would gain from the prices set at an artificially high 
level. 
With respect to low cost predatory pricing, Justice Powell 
said that did not make any economic sense.  The American 
plaintiffs contended that the high profits in Japan put the 
Japanese manufacturers in a position where they could price 
below market levels in the United States.  In order to enjoy any 
benefit from below cost pricing, however, these low prices would 
have to be sustained until competition was driven out of the 
market; and only then could the new found monopolist raise 
prices to recoup all that had been lost on the predatory pricing 
phase, plus interest.  Of course, the American manufacturers also 
assumed that no new entity would enter the market to drive 
down the recently increased prices.  How likely was that?  Not 
very, especially on the facts of that case where the alleged 
conspiratorial behavior had gone on for two decades.  Indeed, the 
prolonged period suggested there could be no conspiracy. 
Justice Powell required the plaintiffs to show more than a 
conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws, they had to show 
that they had been injured by the illegal conduct.  And the injury 
had to be an antitrust injury.  For example, conspiracy to raise 
prices, while illegal, could not have injured the plaintiffs. 
To defeat summary judgment, plaintiffs have to do more 
than cast a doubt on defendants’ behavior.  They have to show 
specific facts demonstrating there is a genuine issue for trial. 
Given the facts and Justice Powell’s antitrust analysis, the 
plaintiffs’ claims were “implausible”—note the word.  That is, 
they make no economic sense.  In these circumstances, plaintiffs 
have to make a stronger showing of the need for a trial.  After 
discovery, you are not entitled to a trial on the hopes that 
something will pop up or that counsel will deliver a withering 
cross-examination or a devastating summation. 
In terms of drawing inferences from the evidence, it is not 
possible to infer a conspiracy merely from parallel conduct.  The 
plaintiffs’ evidence must be compelling enough to exclude the 
possibility that the alleged conspirators acted independently. 
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The Court found that an alleged predatory pricing conspiracy 
was inherently speculative.  For the conspiracy to be rational, the 
conspirators must have a goal of recoupment, or recovery of all 
the losses they experienced with below-cost pricing, together with 
interest.  This is, by definition, an uncertain scheme.  The only 
sure thing is the loss attributed to the below-cost pricing.  And 
low-cost pricing by itself might not be sufficient to win in the 
market place.  The domestic competitors may have deep pockets, 
brand loyalty, territorial preferences, which could frustrate low-
cost pricing.  But, even if the desired monopoly is obtained, it 
must be maintained thereafter.  Justice Powell said that the 
commentators had reached a consensus:  Predatory pricing 
schemes are rarely tried and, even more rarely, successful. 
You should not infer conspiracy when such inferences are 
“implausible”—again, note the word.  And there is a good reason 
not to draw such inferences, it deters pro-competitive conduct.  
And the plaintiffs’ complaint dealt with low prices for good 
television.  That is an antitrust goal—good products sold at 
competitive prices. 
Cutting prices to increase business is the very essence of 
competition.  Inferring a conspiracy from low prices chills the 
precise conduct the antitrust laws are supposed to protect. 
After Matsushita, it is clear that there is no big case, or 
Poller-like, restriction on summary judgment in antitrust cases.  
Summary judgment is now clearly available. 
The same date that the Supreme Court decided Matsushita, 
it also decided two other cases: Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.27 
and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.28  Cites to Anderson and Celotex are 
now standard fare in Rule 56 motions. 
Anderson sets “rules of the road” for granting summary 
judgment.  First, the standard for granting summary judgment 
“mirrors” that for determining a directed verdict motion 
pursuant to Rule 50—judgment as a matter of law.  Second, the 
non-moving party cannot defeat a summary judgment motion by 
showing a scintilla of evidence in support.  Rather, the non-
moving party must show that there is substantial evidence.  
Substantial means enough evidence to support a jury verdict.   
 
 
27 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
28 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
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Third, and finally, if the standard of proof is clear and 
convincing, then proof on the motion for summary judgment 
must meet that standard. 
Celotex picks up where Anderson left off with respect to the 
showings that the moving, and non-moving, party must make. 
Assuming the moving party does not bear the burden of 
persuasion, the moving party can satisfy its burden on the 
motion for summary judgment by showing the lack of factual 
support for an essential element of the non-moving party’s claim.  
If the moving party’s burden is met, the non-moving party must 
introduce specific facts supporting its claim.  Failure to do so 
means that the moving party prevails. 
We know now that summary judgment is as appropriate in 
antitrust cases as it is in any other case.  A recent antitrust case 
in the Second Circuit decided in August 2011 shows you how 
commonplace summary judgment has become. 
The City of New York sued GHI and HIP over their proposed 
merger claiming that the combined entity would wield too much 
power over prices in the healthcare insurance market.  The 
Second Circuit did not bother citing to Matsushita, Anderson, or 
Celotex.  It got right down to business.  The City had to allege a 
“plausible,” “relevant” market.  Of course, the relevant market 
must be defined as a necessary predicate to determine if the 
merger of the two insurers would substantially lessen 
competition.  The market has to include all the products 
reasonably interchangeable by consumers. 
The City failed to do that.  Instead, it defined a market based 
on the two insurers it chose to do business with.  A single 
purchaser’s preference, however, does not define a market, the 
court held. 
The interesting issue in this case was the court’s refusal to 
permit the City to amend.  The court held, correctly in my view, 
that it was too late. 
Remember, with motions to dismiss, it is not unusual to 
allow for a new pleading.  But here, the City moved to enjoin the 
merger, and the Judge who denied the application pointed out 
the flaw in the City’s market definition.  The City did not 
attempt to amend until after the motion for summary judgment 
was made.  This points out, again, the difference between a  
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motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment.  The run 
up to a motion for summary judgment may take longer, but the 
result is more final and complete. 
Let me close with some advice on what you should not do and 
what you should do when you are contemplating a summary 
judgment motion. 
First, do not overburden the court.  I think the one thing I 
dread most is the lawyer who writes in and says:  “This matter is 
too complicated.  Give me leave to file fifty pages.”  I interpret 
this to mean  “Judge, you are a dim bulb; I will enlighten you, but 
given your limitations, it will take me longer than twenty-five 
pages.” 
Second, don’t rely on the pleadings.  As I tried to explain, 
usually the summary judgment motion is long past the time for 
testing the adequacy of the pleadings.  You must recognize you 
are dealing with a different portion of the rule book. 
Third, do not just quote the rules.  And it does not do much 
to complain that the rules have been violated.  For example, I 
was supposed to get the papers on Monday, but he didn’t serve 
them until Tuesday at 9:00 a.m., or the type size was wrong.  
What the court needs is analyses of how the law applies to these 
facts to yield a rational, legally defensible result.  So, what 
should you do? 
First, be specific, precise, and concise.  The shorter and more 
pointed your brief is, the better off you will be.  If you have a 
weak spot do not bury it.  Address it.  Candor counts; it lends 
judicial confidence to the quality of your advocacy.  A district 
judge may very well think, how is this going to look on appeal; 
can this advocate protect the correct decision I want to make? 
Second, spend time identifying the big facts and applicable 
law.  Marshal all the evidence.  Make sure the references are 
clear, precise, and correct. 
Third, be prepared to take advantage of the motion process 
even if you do not prevail.  Remember, that a denial can have a 
silver lining.  Perhaps the court specifies the legal standard it 
will apply and what the proof requirements are to meet that 
standard.  It certainly creates the law of the case.  It may resolve 
certain facts which will expedite the trial.  Sometimes, even if a 
motion for summary judgment is only granted in part, there is  
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little left to try, and the parties may settle.  You may be able to 
use the decision to file in limine motions before trial and Rule 50 
motions after trial. 
I hope I have answered some of your questions and given you 
an overview of some of the strategies and basic concerns about 
making a motion for summary judgment in an antitrust case.  
You should not be hesitant about doing so.  But you should be 
prepared to invest the time, effort, and brain power to take 
maximum advantage of the opportunity. 
Remember that you are one of three hundred civil cases, plus 
fifty criminal cases.  The judge is busy.  He or she will appreciate 
your good efforts to boil it all down so that the issue may be 
properly addressed. 
 
